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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
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LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 In this case we are required to evaluate whether a 
party suing under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 
29 U.S.C. § 794, is required to exhaust administrative remedies 
provided in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 
§2000e-16, and whether suit under the Rehabilitation Act -- with 
prior exhaustion of remedies -- is the exclusive means by which a 
plaintiff may raise claims against federal agencies relating to 
handicap discrimination.  Concluding that the answer to both of 
these questions is yes, we will affirm the district court in most 
respects, while modifying the court's judgment to conform to our 
analysis. 
  
 I. 
 Because this case comes to us upon grant of a motion to 
dismiss, we accept all of the plaintiff's well-pleaded facts as 
true.  Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1977).  
According to the recitations in the amended complaint, the 
following facts comprise this dispute. 
 In early 1992, Kevin Spence applied to the Defense 
Logistics Agency of the Department of Defense ("DLA") for the 
position of "Sewing Machine Operator (Single Needle)."  He passed 
the DLA's competency examination with a score of 85.  The DLA 
promptly provided Spence with a Notice of Rating, which confirmed 
his score and declared him eligible for the sewing machine 
operator position.  On April 23, 1992 Spence passed the physical 
examination required for hire.  After passing another performance 
examination on June 2, 1992, Spence was notified by the DLA that 
he had "been tentatively selected for a permanent position of 
Sewing Machine Operator, W-3." 
 However, on June 24, 1992 Spence was required to take 
an eye examination, and he failed.  The test showed that his 
approximate vision in both eyes was 20/50, and the DLA required 
sewing machine operators to have at least 20/20 vision in one eye 
and 20/40 in the other.  Because he had failed the eye 
examination, Spence was informed that the DLA had rescinded his 
selection as a sewing machine operator. 
 Spence filed a pro se complaint against the DLA in June 
1992.  The DLA moved to dismiss that complaint, but that motion 
was denied because the DLA had not served counsel which had been 
  
appointed to assist Spence.  When a second motion to dismiss was 
properly filed and served, the pro se complaint was dismissed 
without prejudice in March 1994 on the ground that it did not 
with specificity set forth a cause of action under the 
Rehabilitation Act.  The district court noted, however, that new 
counsel had recently been appointed for Spence, and that it was 
likely that this counsel would be able to set forth Spence's 
concerns in a manner providing adequate notice to the DLA of the 
nature of plaintiff's claims.  Thus, Spence's new counsel was 
allowed 30 days to file an amended complaint. 
 This was done.  In the amended complaint, from which 
our factual recitation is gleaned, Spence sued Admiral Edward 
Straw ("Straw"), Director of the DLA, in his official and 
individual capacities, premising jurisdiction upon 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331.  Having provided the factual allegations described above, 
Spence contended in his amended complaint that those facts stated 
two causes of action.  Count One alleged that Spence was a 
handicapped individual as defined under section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act and that he was denied employment as a sewing 
machine operator solely because of his slight vision handicap. 
Spence contended that the DLA's vision requirements were not 
reasonably related to the sewing machine operator position, and 
that even if they were, Spence could perform the job with a 
slight and reasonable accommodation on the part of the DLA, which 
would not unduly burden that agency.  By failing to hire Spence 
because of his handicap, Spence contended, the DLA had violated 
section 504. 
  
 Count Two of the amended complaint alleged that the DLA 
denied Spence equal protection under the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment by singling him out and unnecessarily 
differentiating him because of his vision handicap.  Furthermore, 
Spence contended, the DLA's actions were arbitrary and 
irrational, because Spence had passed the requisite performance 
test showing that he could perform the job of sewing machine 
operator. 
 Straw filed a motion for summary judgment upon and 
dismissal of the amended complaint on two grounds:  (1) Spence 
failed to exhaust administrative remedies on his claim in Count 
One under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prior to filing 
suit, and the amended complaint is now time-barred; and 
(2) Spence's constitutional claim in Count Two should be 
dismissed because the Rehabilitation Act provides exclusive, 
preemptive remedies for a plaintiff pursuing handicap 
discrimination claims.  The district court agreed, and in a 
memorandum and order filed in August 1994, the district court 
granted Straw's motion to dismiss the amended complaint with 
prejudice (and dismissing the motion for summary judgment as 
moot).  Spence timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction of the 
district court's final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
  
 II. 
 We exercise plenary review over a district court's 
dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted.  Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 685 (3d 
Cir. 1993).  Accepting as true all well-pleaded facts in the 
plaintiff's complaint (D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational 
Technical School, 972 F.2d 1364, 1367 (3d Cir. 1992)), the 
relevant inquiry is whether under any reasonable interpretation 
of those allegations the plaintiff may be entitled to relief 
(Holder v. City of Allentown, 987 F.2d 188, 193 (3d Cir. 1993)).  
We apply this standard to both of the district court's central 
holdings below, first discussing exhaustion of remedies prior to 
suing for violation of section 504, and then turning to the 
question of whether the Rehabilitation Act provides the exclusive 
means of raising allegations of discrimination on the basis of 
handicap by federal agencies. 
 A. 
 1. 
 Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 in part 
"to promote and expand employment opportunities in the public and 
private sectors for handicapped individuals and to place such 
individuals in employment." 29 U.S.C. § 701(8) (1976).  The 
Rehabilitation Act approached this goal in a number of ways, but 
one strategy focused on prohibiting discrimination against the 
handicapped by the federal government, federal contractors and 
other recipients of federal funds. 
  
 As originally drafted the Rehabilitation Act required 
federal agencies to submit affirmative action plans for 
handicapped individuals (section 501(b), codified at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 791(b)), required federal contractors to include in their 
contracts provisions mandating that the contractor would take 
affirmative action to employ qualified handicapped individuals 
(section 503, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 793), and stated with 
respect to recipients of federal funds that "[n]o otherwise 
qualified handicapped individual . . . shall, solely by reason of 
his handicap, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program 
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance" (section 504, 
codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794).  However, as originally drafted the 
Rehabilitation Act did not explicitly permit handicapped 
individuals to bring claims for violations of its provisions. 
 Congress filled this gap in 1978, with the Senate and 
House adding different language to what became the Rehabilitation 
Act amendments of that year.  See Prewitt v. United States Postal 
Service, 662 F.2d 292, 301-04 (5th Cir. 1981) (discussing 1978 
amendment process in detail).  The Senate's contribution focused 
on provision of a new section in the Rehabilitation Act -- 
section 505, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794a.  That provision stated 
in section 505(a)(1) that 
 [t]he remedies, procedures, and rights set 
forth in section 717 of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-16) [Title VII], 
including the application of sections 706(f) 
through 706(k) (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f) through 
(k)), shall be available with respect to any 
complaint under [29 U.S.C.] section 791 
  
[Rehabilitation Act section 501] of this 
title . . . .  
Section 505(a)(1), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1). 
 Section 505(a)(2), in turn, provided a private cause of 
action for handicapped individuals against providers and 
recipients of federal assistance, stating: 
 The remedies, procedures, and rights set 
forth in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 [42 U.S.C. §2000d et seq.] shall be 
available to any person aggrieved by any act 
or failure to act by any recipient of Federal 
assistance or Federal provider of such 
assistance under [29 U.S.C.] section 794 of 
this title [Rehabilitation Act section 504]. 
Section 505(a)(2), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2). 
 At the same time the Senate was focusing on new section 
505, the House "extended section 504's proscription against 
handicap discrimination to `any program or activity conducted by 
an Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service 
. . . '"  Prewitt, 662 F.2d at 302.  In short, 
 by its 1978 amendments to the Rehabilitation 
Act, Congress clearly recognized both in 
section 501 and in section 504 that 
individuals now have a private cause of 
action to obtain relief for handicap 
discrimination on the part of the federal 
government and its agencies.  The amendments 
to section 504 were simply the House's answer 
to the same problem that the Senate saw fit 
to resolve by strengthening section 501 [by 
adding section 505].  The joint House-Senate 
conference committee could have chosen to 
eliminate the partial overlap between the two 
provisions, but instead the conference 
committee, and subsequently Congress as a 
whole, chose to pass both provisions, despite 
the overlap. 
Id. at 304. 
  
 Because of the less than artful manner in which 
Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act, the statutory provisions 
produce an apparently incongruent enforcement scheme.  Federal 
agencies may, by the terms of the Rehabilitation Act, be sued for 
violation of either section 501 or 504 of the Act.  If a party 
sues a federal agency for violation of section 501 by pursuing a 
claim under section 505(a)(1), Title VII remedies are 
"available."  29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1).  Under Title VII, the 
remedies available include any remedies for discrimination 
provided by the federal agency itself.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c).  
The Supreme Court has explained that when Title VII remedies are 
available, they must be exhausted before a plaintiff may file 
suit.  And although section 505(a)(1) states only that Title VII 
remedies are "available" when one complains of a violation of 
section 501, "the legislative history leaves no doubt that 
Congress meant to require exhaustion of administrative remedies 
[in such cases] just as in ordinary Title VII actions."  
McGuinness v. United States Postal Service, 744 F.2d 1318, 1320 
(7th Cir. 1984), citing S.Rep. No. 890, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 
18-19 (1978); 124 Cong. Rec. 30578 (1978) (remarks of Senator 
Cranston); and Prewitt, 662 F.2d at 303-04.  Thus, a party is 
barred from suing a federal agency for violation of section 501 
if he or she has failed to exhaust administrative remedies under 
Title VII. 
 However, an aggrieved party may also sue a federal 
agency for violation of section 504 -- which Congress amended in 
1978 to prohibit discrimination by federal agencies -- by 
  
pursuing a claim under section 505(a)(2).  Section 505(a)(2), 
however, states that the "remedies, procedures, and rights of 
Title VI" -- and not Title VII -- are available.  29 U.S.C. 
§ 794a(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
 Spence argues that since he sued the DLA for violation 
of section 504, Title VII remedies were not available to him and 
need not have been exhausted.  Appellant's Br. 11-12.  
Furthermore, he correctly notes that although we have not 
directly ruled on the issue of whether Title VI remedies must be 
exhausted before suit may be brought to enforce section 504, we 
have ruled that exhaustion of remedies is not required when a 
claim is brought pursuant to Title VI.  Id. 12, citing Chowdhury 
v. Redding Hospital & Medical Center, 677 F.2d 317 (3d Cir. 
1982).  Thus, Spence concludes, he did not have to exhaust any 
administrative remedies before filing suit. 
 However, we reject Spence's analysis, having been 
particularly persuaded by Judge Posner's lucid statutory 
construction of the Rehabilitation Act in McGuinness, a case 
closely analogous to the one before us.  In McGuinness, an 
applicant for a job as a postman with the Milwaukee office of the 
United States Postal Service was rejected on the ground that his 
flat feet and hammer toes rendered him physically unfit for the 
job.  He appealed his rejection to the general manager of the 
Postal Service's employee relations division, but when he was 
told by the general manager that the decision was final, he did 
not "take the next step open to him, which would have been to 
consult with the Postal Service's equal employment opportunity 
  
counselor, followed (if necessary) by the filing of a formal 
complaint."  McGuinness, 744 F.2d at 1320. 
 Instead, McGuinness sued the Postal Service, seeking 
damages and the next available postman vacancy.  The district 
court dismissed McGuinness's complaint and, significantly, 
refused to permit him to amend the complaint to state a claim 
under section 505(a)(1) because he had failed to exhaust his 
administrative remedies.  On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed 
the district court's dismissal, modifying it only to make clear 
that dismissal was without prejudice to McGuinness "bringing a 
new suit if and when he exhausts his administrative remedies."  
McGuinness, 744 F.2d at 1321. 
 McGuinness argued that he did not have to exhaust 
administrative remedies because his suit was being asserted under 
section 504, rather than 505(a)(1).  However, the court of 
appeals rejected that contention in language that is applicable 
here: 
 Although section 504 has been held applicable 
to employment discrimination as well as other 
forms of discrimination against the 
handicapped by recipients of federal money 
. . . it is unlikely that Congress, having 
specifically addressed employment of the 
handicapped by federal agencies (as distinct 
from employment by recipients, themselves 
nonfederal, of federal money) in section 501, 
would have done so again a few sections later 
in section 504.  Moreover, as McGuinness 
himself is quick to point out, section 505 
does not make Title VII remedies available to 
people complaining of a violation of section 
504; instead, in subsection (a)(2), it makes 
Title VI remedies available to them.  
McGuinness made no attempt to exhaust Title 
VI remedies either.  Now it is true that he 
  
probably would not have been required to do 
so even if section 504 were applicable to his 
claim.  Title VI remedies -- which involve 
things like cutting off federal funds to the 
discriminator -- are not designed to help 
individuals . . . .  But that is beside the 
point.  The point is that it would make no 
sense for Congress to provide (and in the 
very same section -- 505(a)) different sets 
of remedies, having different exhaustion 
requirements, for the same wrong committed by 
the same employer; and there is no indication 
that Congress wanted to do this -- as of 
course it could do regardless of what might 
seem sensible to us -- when it added section 
505 in 1978. 
McGuinness, 744 F.2d at 1321 (citations omitted).  The Seventh 
Circuit concluded that either an individual should not be 
permitted to sue a federal agency under section 504, or 
alternatively that an individual asserting a claim based upon 
section 504 must first exhaust Title VII remedies.  Id. at 
1321-22. 
 We note that although our sister circuits have not been 
entirely consistent in the manner in which they have reached the 
ultimate result, the Seventh Circuit's resolution of the 
exhaustion issue in McGuinness is consistent with other courts of 
appeals that have faced the question of whether a plaintiff must 
exhaust Title VII remedies before bringing suit under section 
504.  One court of appeals has explicitly ruled that an 
individual may sue a federal agency or the Postal Service only 
under sections 501 and 505(a)(1).  See Boyd v. United States 
Postal Service, 752 F.2d 410, 413 (9th Cir. 1985).  Other courts 
of appeals have found that if a litigant sues a federal agency 
  
under sections 504 and 505(a)(2), he or she must satisfy Title 
VII remedies so as not to evade the remedial scheme developed by 
Congress in the Rehabilitation Act.  Prewitt v. United States 
Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981); Smith v. United 
States Postal Service, 742 F.2d 257 (6th Cir. 1984); Morgan v. 
United States Postal Service, 798 F.2d 1162, 1164-65 (8th Cir. 
1986); Doe v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1990).  Finally, 
in Milbert v. Koop, 830 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1987), the District 
of Columbia Circuit determined that it need not decide whether 
suits by individuals under sections 504 and 505(a)(2) are barred, 
but noted that courts that had allowed suits under those 
provisions had required exhaustion of Title VII remedies prior to 
suit, and strongly suggested plaintiffs suing federal agencies 
for handicap discrimination in the future "seek relief under 
section 501 rather than under section 504."  Id. at 357.  After 
examination of this case law, and adopting Judge Posner's 
analysis in McGuinness, we conclude that a plaintiff must exhaust 
Title VII remedies before bringing suit under sections 504 and 
505(a)(2) of the Rehabilitation Act, just as he or she must 
before suing under sections 501 and 505(a)(1) of the Act.1 
                     
1
.   Spence relies principally upon three cases:  Camenisch v. 
University of Texas, 616 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated on 
other grounds, 451 U.S. 390 (1981), Pushkin v. Regents of 
University of Colorado, 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981), and 
Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Community 
Television of Southern California, 719 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1983).  
However, those cases are distinguishable:  in each of those cases 
the defendant contended only that Title VI remedies had to be 
exhausted.  Camenisch, 616 F.2d at 133-36; Pushkin, 658 F.2d at 
1381-82; Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness, 719 F.2d at 
1021; see also Smith v. Barton, 914 F.2d 1330 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(stating that since "administrative remedies" under section 504 
  
 2. 
 The DLA argued to the district court that under the 
regulations governing the filing of discrimination complaints 
with the DLA, Spence had 45 days from the date of the alleged 
discrimination in which to contact an Equal Employment 
Opportunity counselor at the DLA.  Joint Appendix ("J.A.") 67, 
citing 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1).  The agency further noted that 
Spence could have sought an extension of the 45 day period 
(..continued) 
result only in "suspension or termination of the federal 
assistance to the institutional recipient" (i.e., Title VII), 
exhaustion is not required).  There was no indication, therefore, 
that any of those courts addressed the applicability or relevance 
of Title VII remedies.  Furthermore, we note that the Fifth 
Circuit subsequently limited its Camenisch holding to suits 
involving claims against federal grantees -- in suits against 
federal agencies under the Rehabilitation Act, parties are 
required to exhaust their Title VII remedies.  Prewitt v. United 
States Postal Service, 662 F.2d 311, 314 (5th Cir. 1981).  And as 
explained in the text, in Boyd v. United States Postal Service, 
752 F.2d 410 (9th Cir. 1985), the Ninth Circuit found that 
individuals may sue federal agencies only under sections 501 and 
505(a)(1) of the Rehabilitation Act, undercutting Spence's 
reliance upon Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness. 
 
 Spence also argues that our decisions in Chowdhury v. 
Redding Hospital & Medical Center, 677 F.2d 317 (3d Cir. 1982), 
and Cheyney State College Faculty v. Hufstedler, 703 F.2d 732 (3d 
Cir. 1983), suggest that exhaustion of administrative remedies is 
not required prior to filing suit under sections 504 and 
505(a)(2).  We disagree.  Chowdhury and Cheyney State College 
Faculty stand for the proposition that a party need not exhaust 
Title VI remedies before filing a suit claiming a violation of 
that statute.  Although in Chowdhury we drew support for our 
conclusion that exhaustion is not required under Title VI from 
cases construing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 
(Chowdhury, 677 F.2d at 322), neither Chowdhury nor Cheyney State 
College Faculty involved a claim under the Rehabilitation Act, 
thus neither case discussed whether a litigant pursuing a claim 
under sections 504 and 505(a)(2) has any duty to exhaust Title 
VII remedies.  We decline to turn obiter dictum in Chowdhury into 
a holding here. 
  
pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(2), which permits an agency to 
extend the 45-day time limit of subsection (a)(1) of the 
regulation 
 when the individual shows that he or she was 
not notified of the time limits and was not 
otherwise aware of them, that he or she did 
not know and reasonably should not have been 
known [sic] that the discriminatory matter or 
personnel action occurred, that despite due 
diligence he or she was prevented by 
circumstances beyond his or her control from 
contacting the counselor within the time 
limits, or for other reasons considered 
sufficient by the agency . . . ." 
29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(2).  The DLA contended that since it was 
undisputed that the alleged discriminatory act had occurred back 
in 1992 and that Spence had not exhausted his Title VII remedies, 
the 45-day time limit had run on his ability to pursue those 
remedies, such administrative action was now barred, and his 
amended complaint should therefore be dismissed with prejudice as 
untimely.2 
 The district court dismissed Spence's section 504 claim 
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, but failed to 
note whether that dismissal was with or without prejudice.  We 
believe that the complaint should be dismissed as premature, 
rather than untimely, and without prejudice to Spence's potential 
to file suit again upon exhaustion of administrative remedies.  
We note that the regulations cited by the DLA state that the 
                     
2
.   On appeal, the DLA does not state whether it continues to 
maintain that Spence's claims are time-barred -- or potentially 
premature. 
  
agency may decide to accept an otherwise untimely administrative 
complaint "for other reasons considered sufficient by the 
agency."  29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1).  Although we are skeptical 
whether the DLA will consider Spence's possible argument that he 
did not know that he had to exhaust Title VII remedies before 
suing under sections 504 and 505(a)(2) "sufficient reason" to 
extend the 45-day deadline, that issue is for the DLA to 
determine in the first instance.  Cf. McGuinness, 744 F.2d at 
1320-21 (interpreting similar provision in 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1613.214(a)(4), and clarifying that dismissal in that case was 
"without prejudice to [McGuinness] bringing a new suit if and 
when he exhausts his administrative remedies").  Thus, we will 
clarify the district court's order dismissing this action to note 
that Spence may maintain another suit if he pursues his Title VII 
remedies, the DLA excuses his failure to file the complaint 
during the 45 days following the alleged discriminatory act, and 
he exhausts the relevant procedures.  We offer no view as to the 
appropriate outcome; instead, we emphasize that this is a matter 
for the DLA, not us, to determine. 
 B. 
 The district court dismissed Spence's claim that the 
DLA denied Spence equal protection under the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment (and that the DLA's actions were arbitrary 
and irrational) on the ground that the Rehabilitation Act 
provides the exclusive means by which a litigant may raise claims 
of discrimination on the basis of handicap by federal agencies.  
  
Spence challenges that holding, as well, but we agree with the 
district court's conclusion. 
 Given that we have found that a litigant must exhaust 
administrative remedies under Title VII before filing suit 
against a federal agency alleging discrimination on the basis of 
handicap under sections 504 and 505(a)(2) of the Rehabilitation 
Act, it would be anomalous to permit a litigant to avoid that 
remedial scheme by simply asserting an independent constitutional 
claim premised upon the same facts.  As the Seventh Circuit 
explained in McGuinness in rejecting a similar claim under the 
Fifth Amendment, "[A]ny effort to avoid sections 505's 
requirement of exhausting administrative remedies by challenging 
the same conduct under another provision of law must fail because 
it would `allow [Congress's] careful and thorough remedial scheme 
to be circumvented by artful pleading.'"  McGuinness, 744 F.2d at 
1322, quoting Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 U.S. 
820, 833 (1976).3  Thus, although a litigant may raise claims 
such as those asserted by Spence in a suit following exhaustion 
of Title VII remedies, he or she may not do so without first 
pursuing those remedies. 
                     
3
.   Courts have held that section 504 does not prevent a 
litigant from asserting a separate theory that is not simply a 
disguised handicap discrimination claim.  E.g., Smith v. Barton, 
914 F.2d 1330, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990) (Rehabilitation Act does not 
bar a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on alleged violations of 
a First Amendment right to association, since plaintiffs "allege 
violations that are unrelated to issues of handicap 
discrimination").  While we do not foreclose that possibility, we 
find that Spence's due process/equal protection argument is 
essentially identical to his argument under the Rehabilitation 
Act, and therefore is barred absent prior exhaustion of Title VII 
remedies. 
  
 III. 
 We will modify the judgment of the district court to 
clarify that dismissal of Spence's suit is without prejudice to 
Spence bringing another suit under the Rehabilitation Act if and 
when he exhausts his Title VII administrative remedies under the 
Act.  In all other respects, the district court will be affirmed. 
_________________________ 
 
 
